

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING
Department of State

1959 JUN 15 PM 11 00

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

Auth'd by NND 911089

By HR-m/SG 2/90/92

(Verbatim Text)

SENT TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2117 NIACT

Rptd Info: AMCONSUL GENEVA TOCAH 108 NIACT
PRIORITY

OBSERVE PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Following is text letter dated today from President to Khrushchev for immediate delivery to Foreign Office. Confirm delivery Department and Secretary at Geneva.

June 15, 1959
STE /Dear Mr. Chairman: The point seems to have been reached in the discussions among the four Foreign Ministers in Geneva at which I feel impelled to address to you this personal and private note. I shall give it no publicity whatsoever unless you should desire otherwise.

It has been my sincere hope that the progress at the Foreign Ministers' meeting would be such as to justify a summit meeting at which final settlements of some of our problems could be reached. This ~~note~~ ^{note} ~~sakka~~ is a personal effort to explain to you why I feel that recent developments at Geneva ~~xxxxx~~ imperil the achievement of this objective.

Draftsman:

The President
EUR:FDKohler:bsm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Acting Secretary

Clearance:

S/S - Mr. Seip

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Classification

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COPY IS PROHIBITED.

911089-309

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Classification

The Soviet Delegation, while unwilling to discuss in a serious way the broad peace plan which we put forward, has now, after some weeks of both private and plenary sessions, put forward proposals with respect to Berlin which are from our viewpoint a clearly unacceptable challenge to our position in that city. At the same time ~~Mr. Gromyko~~ has stated that INNER QUOTE in the opinion of the Soviet Government there is no foundation for any link between the results of this conference and the convening of a summit meeting END INNER QUOTE. Because of your original acceptance on March 30 of my March 26 proposal with respect to the current negotiations between us, I had come to believe that we were coming closer together in this important matter. You will probably recall that ⁱⁿ part of my March 26 proposal ~~(as you know)~~ I said, INNER QUOTE The purpose of the Foreign Ministers meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer. On this understanding and as soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers Meeting justify holding a summit

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conference, the US Government would be ready to participate in such a conference. The date, place, and agenda for such a conference ~~would~~ would be proposed by the meeting of Foreign Ministers END INNER QUOTE.

You in your March 30 reply then stated: INNER QUOTE. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that all participants of the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will make their positive contribution to the work of this conference and that it will be an important step in the cause of creating a firm peace in Europe. The Soviet Government, on its part, will do everything possible to assist in the attainment of this goal END INNER QUOTE.

I sincerely hope that both you and I continue to hold to the spirit of ~~this~~ understanding and will do what we can in assuring that the Foreign Ministers' talks will produce ~~satisfactory~~ ^{satisfactory} ~~maximum~~ ^{maximum} results.

It seems to me, unfortunately, that the latest Soviet position at Geneva as presented by Mr. Gromyko creates an impossible situation for the United States in that it implies the convocation of a Summit Meeting without prior progress of any kind.

I am ~~quite~~ quite prepared to recognize that final agreements on the critical questions affecting world peace could probably be best concluded at a meeting of the Heads of Government. However, I want to say very earnestly that our Secretary of State has gone to Geneva with full authority from me and from the US Government to engage in

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serious negotiations of the type contemplated in the exchange of communications between us which led to the holding of the Foreign Ministers conference. I have no way of knowing, of course, Mr. Chairman, to what extent your own Foreign Minister is empowered by you to negotiate with this same degree of flexibility within the framework of what I thought was a firm understanding between you and me. But I do assure you that our purpose in the Foreign Ministers meeting has been to clear the way for a fruitful or at least hopeful meeting of Heads of Government.

I hope you will urgently consider the situation as it now stands. I write to you in no sense of attempting to bargain or to establish conditions. It is my thought only to see whether we will be able to achieve some greater measure of understanding between ourselves and eventually to reach settlements in some of the issues that divide us. Only thus, I think, can we bring about a real relaxation of the present tensions in the world. It would give me great satisfaction if we could meet later this year for that purpose.

I add only that if such a meeting were to offer hope of success it would certainly have to take place in an atmosphere in which neither side was posing a threat to the other and on the basis of such preparatory work by our Foreign Ministers as could give us

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reason to believe that the Heads of Government would be able to reach agreement on significant subjects. Anything less, it seems to me, would be a betrayal of the hopes of men everywhere.

Sincerely yours,

Dwight D. Eisenhower. END QUOTE.

OBSERVE PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

(Verbatim Text)



Dillon **DILLON**

ACTING SECRETARY

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Secret

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(Classification) (TOCAH 106)POST Moscow

INCOMING

OUTGOING XNUMBER 2117 (TOCAH 108 Gene)DATE 6/15/59CONTROL 9023SUBJECT Ltr from Pres toKhrushchev (6/15/59)"C"

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CONFERENCE OR SPECIAL FILE

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911089-314

Mr. Dillon
Dong:

This is a rough -
account of conversations with
Chris. The conversations was not
too good and you might
want to read this before
talking to the Pres.

Secretary Herter telephoned the following suggested changes
in the message itself:

1. Second paragraph - word "progress development" stick to our original language.
2. Next paragraph - Soviet Delegation
3. 6 lines below - Mr. Gromyko stated Third
4. ~~xx~~ from last paragraph - Soviet Delegation
5. Next to the last paragraph

9/19/61 in it

We had a long session today and very conclusive, except for one thing. We narrowed it down on their wanting an agreement to get out of Berlin and unwillingness to give up our rights. We cannot give in on this. We hope very much that this wire of the President's can go as soon as possible. Couve and Selwyn would too. We have adjourned until Wednesday afternoon. We will probably give them a paper tomorrow which is our position stated in the best public relations terms. It will leave us in a better public relations position. We met for 3 hours. They are tough.

RM: It is a matter of long practice. Do you still have that feeling that some of their attitudes might have been induced by a notion that ~~xxxxxx~~ one of our friends may have been very favorably disposed in some regard?

H: Yes. But he is playing it pretty well. (Mr. Herter mentioned his message to the President containing his off-the-cuff suggestion.)

RM: Yes. That is really what lead to this suggestion about this special message we were discussing.

H: I am glad we did. I think this message will hit it off.

RM: I am sure it should and that was the idea because otherwise it would have put him in rather unfavorable posture, because even a meeting held under the auspices mentioned, everybody would have regarded it as just the same thing. So you could not separate the sheep from the goats on that. That is what led to the ~~campaign~~ ^{message} we are suggesting now.

H: I am all for it. From our point of view, the sooner the better.

RM: He is wondering whether something of a specific nature can be

911089-315

10/10/61

injected into the draft we were just discussing and he said over the weekend he had been giving a lot of thought to it but had not hit on any useful point that might appeal to the recipient of the message.

H: From a public relations point of view ~~it's~~ would be difficult

RM: He was really trying to provide a hook for the other man to hang his hat on and asking for suggestions. This is just my notion of what that might be as a possibility.

H: There are two places where it is tough - one has to do with the impossible conditions on Berlin, and I hope that stays at it is. The other has put us in an impossible position. ~

RM: His speculation ran along a number of other lines as to what might be offered as a hook, as a way out, and I just wanted to mention that because no satisfactory one has been suggested.

H: I think those things will come out. Until Nixon has been in Moscow I don't think we will get into a ~~xt~~ serious situation. In the interim keep a stiff upper lip.

RM: There is no inclination here to yield on anything, but the question of dressing it up.

H: Fine.

RM: We are all solid

H: (Mr. Herter again said to get the message out tonight, also let him have a duplicate text and plans for release.)

211089-316

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June 15, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: O - Mr. Murphy

I have consulted some of the boys and given considerable thought to the possibility of a "gimmick" which could be offered in the letter to Khrushchev. It is my considered conclusion that any such offer would be dangerous and counter-productive. In my view it is much better that the language remain as at present, with the quotation from our original proposal which can be interpreted as a position agreed by the Soviets, and with the intimation in the last paragraph that the minimum conditions are an agreed "status quo" with respect to Berlin and a reasonable agenda for a Summit conference.

I am satisfied that an offer of a limited concession of some kind would (1) undercut the five-point program presented to Gromyko in private session on June 3 by Couve on behalf of the three Powers (CAHTO 64); (2) risk taking the negotiations out of the hands of the Foreign Ministers entirely by making them a subject of continuing correspondence between Khrushchev and the President; (3) be seized upon by Khrushchev as constituting the full price to be paid for a Summit meeting; (4) be interpreted by the Soviets as a first step down the "slippery slope".

I don't see any possibility of our offering anything specific which would be regarded by Khrushchev as sufficiently substantial to lead him to instruct Gromyko to re-enter negotiations which might lead to even additional concessions under the five-point program presently on the table or under the privately agreed possible understanding presented to Gromyko on June 8 (CAHTO 90) or under the prospective "possible final position" contained in CAHTO 109. Certainly an isolated offer to reduce the present troop levels in Berlin would not be sufficient and would involve serious problems with regard to reaction and morale of the West Berliners. Likewise a suggestion of an offer

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in fields not directly related to the current negotiations such as an increase in exchanges could be expected to have no result except perhaps utterly to confuse Khrushchev as to our intentions. Moreover if we were thinking of public opinion in the Western countries then it seems to me the present language is the best. A specific effort of concession in my view could only alarm the die-hards and would certainly not satisfy the wishy-washy "appeasement at any cost" types.

I accordingly reiterate my conviction that it would be a mistake to try to find any specific gimmicks to offer in this communication. It might be worthwhile however to refer specifically to our expressed willingness to negotiate as represented by the five-point program. This readiness to negotiate is implicit in the communication as it stands now but not explicit.

Foy D. Kohler

EUR:FDKohler:s/

911690-318

6/15/69

SECRET

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The point seems to have been reached in the discussions among the four Foreign Ministers in Geneva at which I feel impelled to address to you this personal and private note. I shall give it no publicity whatsoever unless you should desire otherwise.

It has been my sincere hope that the progress at the Foreign Ministers' meeting would be such as to justify a summit meeting at which final settlements of some of our problems could be reached. This ^{note} ~~cable~~ is a personal effort to explain to you why I feel that recent developments at Geneva imperil the achievement of this objective.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, while unwilling to discuss in a serious way the broad peace plan which we put forward, has now, after some weeks of both private and plenary sessions, put forward proposals with respect to Berlin which are from our viewpoint a clearly unacceptable challenge to our ~~position~~ in that city. At the same time he has stated that "in the opinion of the Soviet Government there is no foundation for any link between the results of this conference and the convening of a summit meeting." Because of your original acceptance on March 30 of my March 26 proposal with respect to the current negotiations between us, I had come to believe that we were coming closer together in this important matter. You will probably recall ^{that} part of my March 26 proposal in ~~which~~ I said, "The purpose of the Foreign Ministers meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer. On this understanding and as

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soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers Meeting justify holding a summit conference, the US Government would be ready to participate in such a conference. The date, place, and agenda for such a conference would be proposed by the meeting of Foreign Ministers." (X) *first*

I sincerely hope that both you ^{and} ~~and our~~ hold to the spirit of this understanding and will do what we can in ~~reaching~~ ^{assuring that} the Foreign Ministers talks ^{in the} ~~will produce~~ ^{in the} ~~and assure some~~ ^{the conclusion of} ^{without} ^{prior progress} ^{to} ~~will produce~~ ~~and assure some~~ satisfactory results therefrom.

It seems to me, unfortunately, that the latest Soviet position at Geneva ^{as presented by Mr. Gromyko} creates an impossible situation for the United States. I am quite prepared ^{to} ~~to admit~~ ^{to} ~~recognize~~ ^{CP} that final agreements on the critical questions affecting world peace could probably be best concluded at a meeting of the Heads of Government. However, I want to say very earnestly that our Secretary of State has gone to Geneva with full authority from me and from the US Government to engage in serious negotiations of the type contemplated in the exchange of communications between us which led to the holding of the Foreign Ministers conference. I have no way of knowing, of course, Mr. Chairman, to what extent your own Foreign Minister is empowered by you to negotiate with this same degree of ^{within the framework of what I thought was a firm} flexibility, and with the same purpose in mind. But I do assure you that our purpose has been to clear the way in the Foreign Ministers Meeting for a fruitful or at least hopeful meeting of Heads of Governments.

I hope you will urgently consider the situation as it now stands. I write to you in no sense of attempting to bargain or to establish conditions. It is my thought only to see whether we will be able to achieve some greater measure of understanding between ourselves and eventually to reach settlements in some

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of the issues that divide us. Only thus, I think, can we bring about a real relaxation of the present tensions in the world. It would give me great satisfaction if we could meet later this year for that purpose.

I add only that if such a meeting were to offer hope of success it would certainly have to take place in an atmosphere in which neither side was posing a threat to the other and on the basis of preparatory work by our Foreign Ministers ~~which~~ ^{such} gives us reason to believe that the Heads of Government ~~could~~ ^{as could} reach agreement on significant subjects. Anything less, it seems to me, would be a betrayal of the hopes of men everywhere.

~~With all my best regards~~
Sincerely yours
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6/15/59

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Delegation
The Soviet Foreign Minister, while unwilling to discuss in a serious way the broad peace plan which we put forward, has now, after some weeks of both private and plenary sessions, put forward proposals with respect to Berlin which are from our viewpoint a clearly unacceptable challenge to our position in that city. At the same time he has stated that in the opinion of the Soviet Government there is no foundation for any further negotiations at the Foreign Ministers' conference and the convening of a summit meeting. Because of your original acceptance on March 30 of my March 26 proposal with respect to the current negotiations between us, I had come to believe that we were coming closer together in this important matter. You will probably recall that part of my March 26 proposal in which I said, "The purpose of the Foreign Ministers' meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer. On this understanding and as

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I sincerely hope that both you and I hold to the spirit of this understanding and will do what we can in reviving the Foreign Ministers talks and assure some satisfactory results therefrom.

It seems to me, unfortunately, that the latest Soviet position at Geneva creates an impossible situation for the United States. I am quite prepared to admit that final agreements on the critical questions affecting world peace could probably be best concluded at a meeting of the Heads of Government. However, I want to say very earnestly that our Secretary of State has gone to Geneva with full authority from me and from the US Government to engage in serious negotiations of the type contemplated in the exchange of communications between us which led to the holding of the Geneva Ministers' conference.

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I hope you will urgently consider the situation as it now stands. I write to you in no sense of attempting to bargain or to establish conditions. It is my thought only to see whether we will be able to achieve some greater measure of understanding between ourselves and eventually to reach settlements in some

But I will recall the following passage to
you from your note of March 30: 1. _____ And
in this connection, I do

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of the issues that divide us. Only thus, I think, can we bring about a real relaxation of the present tensions in the world. It would give me great satisfaction if we could meet later this year for that purpose.

I add only that if such a meeting were to offer hope of success it would certainly have to take place in an atmosphere in which neither side was posing a threat to the other and on the basis of preparatory work by our Foreign Ministers which gives us reason to believe that the Heads of Government could reach agreement on significant subjects. Anything less, it seems to me, would be a betrayal of the hopes of men everywhere.

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